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EXEMPTION LAWS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
In the history of the law of the English peoples the varying extent to which a creditor may subject the person and
property of his debtor to execution in satisfaction of his
claim has reflected prevaifing principles of public policy. The
relation of debtor and creditor creates a liability on the part
of the person and estate of the debtor for the gatisfaction of
the demands of the creditor, exemption from which is procured not by reason of any special merit in the debtor personally or in his position as debtor, or by reason of any especial unworthiness of the creditor, but in spite of the merits
of his position and for reasons which concern the well-being
of the body politic. The interests of the state or of society,
as a whole, in maintaining the individual as an efficient unit,
are in conflict with the narrow interests of the creditor seeking satisfaction from the person or estate of his debtor.
Upon the degree to which the peculiar interests of the
creditor or commercial class predominate in moulding public policy and legislation, depends, in great part, the scope
of execution. When England was a military or feudal
721

EXEMPTION LAWS AND PUBLIC POLICY.

state, whose interests were best subserved by the prevention
of the impairment of the efficiency of any of its individual
members, there was wide exemption of person and estate
from execution. As England developed from a feudal into A
commercial state, the creditor class was given greater security, in the increasing objects of execution, until there was virtually no limitation whatever upon the liability of both the
person and estate of the debtor to the satisfaction of the
creditor's claim. With the modem evolution of benevolent
and altruistic principles insisting that the well-being of the
state will not admit of the impairment of the efficiency of the
individual, by his imprisonment or complete impoverishment,
to meet the demands of a creditor, the scope of execution was
limited. The exemption laws were the means by which,;
pursuant to the predominant principles of public policy, the
person of the debtor was almost entirely, and his estate partially, relieved from liability for his debts.
In the early stages of the common law, when the institutions of feudalism were at their height, execution was restricted to personal property, with some rare exceptions in
favor of the crown, which could, under certain circumstances, seize the person or lands of its debtors. The militarism of the feudal state, subordinating all other interests to
those dictated by the necessity of defence against foes, preserved the persons and lands of the great majority of debtors
from execution. The personal duties owed by the vassal
to the lord, and the paramount obligatiori to hold himself
ever ready to attend his lord in his military enterprises or
assist him in his defence, procured for the person of the vassal immunity from imprisonment for debt. Similarly the
old feudal'system of land tenures, under which the lord parcelled out his estate to his military retainers, who held only
at the will of the lord, was incompatible with an execution
against land, by virtue of which possession of land might
be transferred from a loyal and soldierly tenant to one physically unfit to perform military services or lacking in loyal
fealty to his lord.
The so-called common-law writs of execution were the
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fieri facias and the levari facias, the former against the

debtor's goods, the latter against the present profits of his
lands in addition to his goods. It was only with the decline
of feudalism and the growth of the towns and of commerce
that creditors were accorded increased rights against their
debtors' persons and estates. When the lord found it
cheaper and more advantageous to depend upon hired soldiers, rather than upon feudatories, perhaps incapable of,
bearing the burdens of war or else engaged in necessary
farming, and as the money for their hire came to be advanced by the increasingly influential money-lending and
commercial classes of the rising towns, and as the restrictions on the alienation of land wore away, so, too, did the"
restrictions upon the availability of land and of the person of
the debtor for execution in satisfaction of debt wear away;
and the demands of the creditor class for increased security
were met by a number of statutes bringing the debtor's person aid lands within the grasp of the creditor.
The capias ad satisfaciendum was first allowed in civil
actions for torts producing a breach of the peace. It was
then extended to cases of frauds, and by Statutes 52 Henry
III and 13 Edw. I to actions of account. By Statute 25 Edward III it was granted in actions of debt and detinue; and
finally by Statute i9 Hen. VII, allowing it to issue in actions
on the case, the remedy became a general one in enforcing
the collection of debts.
Execution against land, entitling the creditor to take
possession of his debtor's real estate was secured only
by a number of statutes passed at intervals during a long
period of time. The Statute of Westminster 2, 13
Edw. I. c. 18, gave to the creditor the choice of a tleri
facias or of a new writ, known as an elegit, so called from
the choice accorded the plaintiff, under which writ if the
defendant's goods were insufficient to satisfy the judgment,
the plaintiff was put in possession of one-half the debtor's
freehold lands, to be held by him until out of the rents and
profits thereof, the debt was paid. A broader remedy was
provided for traders by the Statute of Acton Burnel de Mer-
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catoribus, passed the same year, 13 Edw. I. Under this act
a recognizance could be entered into by a debtor for debts
contracted in the course of trade before the Mayor of London or chief warden of another city, and upon default, the
body and goods of the debtor were subject to execution, and
an extent was issuable delivering to the plaintiff the whole
of the defendant's lands, to be held by the plaintiff until he
had made his claim out of the rents and profits. This
remedy was known as the Statute Merchant. Of a similar
nature was the remedy provided, also for traders, by Statute
27 Edw. III, c. 9, known as the Statute Staple, under which
a recognizance was entered into before the chief magistrate
of any staple or grand mart of the leading manufactures or
commodities. The Statute of 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6, extended
the remedies of.the Statutes Merchant and Staple to all the
subjects of the kingdom, providing a remedy called a "Recognizance in the Nature of a Statute Staple."
As a result of this legislation, by the early part of the sixteenth century, a debtor became liable to imprisonment, and
his lands as well as goods became answerable, for his debts.
The growing power and influence of the rising commercial
classes had beaten down the restrictions imposed on execution by the necessities of feudalism; and the predominance
of that power continued the rigor of the law practically unabated for four centuries, until the nineteenth. During this
period there w&e substantially no exemptions from executions. Executions consumed the whole of the debtor's estate
and inflicted upon his person a punishment more severe than
was meted out for the commission of many crimes. Necessary wearing apparel in use was exempt, but the law admitted of no evasion by a liberal construction of the amount
of apparel that might be conceived to be "necessary."
If a
man had two gowns, one of them could be levied upon.1
The insolvency statutes were the first sources of alleviation of the debtor's condition; providing him with a means
of obtaining release from imprisonment for debts. The
'HoIt

in Hardistley v. Barney. Comb. 356.
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Statute of 32 Geo. II, c. 28, enabled the imprisoned debtor
to secure his release, if taken in execution for a debt not exceeding one hundred pounds, by the surrender of all his property except a small quantity of bedding, wearing apparel and
tools which he was permitted to retain. The act testifies to
the wretched conditions that prevailed in the debtors' jails,
where it depended upon the kindness of the prisoner's friends
or the charity of strangers to afford him proper sustenance.
Under this statute, despite the debtor's offer to surrender
his property, the creditor could still insist upon his detention
by allowing a weekly pittance of 2s. 4d. for his support.
This statute was followed by others whose provisions extended to an ever-widening class of imprisoned debtors, and
afforded them in insolvency proceedings means for release
from imprisonment. Such insolvency laws were general
throughout this country at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.
The next phase of the humanitarian movement in the relief of debtors from the drastic operation of the various writs
of execution was the passage of a number of laws during
the period from the end of the eighteenth until the fourth
decade of the last century, exempting fiom execution on
feri facias a portion of the debtor's personal property. These
statutes were kindled, in the main, by the desire to secure
the debtor from total impoverishment and the consequent
crippling of his power to sustain himself and his family,
without greatly impairing the efficacy of the writ or the value
of the remedy for creditors. The exemption extended to
such articles as wearing apparel, Bibles, school books,
specific pieces of household furniture and farming implements and the like. The Pennsylvania Statute of 1849
is a fair illustration of these laws, exempting Bibles, school
books, wearing apparel and $3oo worth of property to be
selected by the debtor. Under these personal property exemption laws, for the first time could a debtor save from
sale under a fief facias any of his goods and chattels. From
the earliest times hitherto, the feri facias subjected the whole
of a debtor's personalty to liability for his debts.
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At about the same time the agitation for legislation to
abolish imprisonment for debt bore fruit. In Alabama in
1839, in Pennsylvania in 1842, and in other states at about
that period, statutes were passed putting an end to imprisonment for debt, and in England at about the time of the publication of Dickens' "Little Dorrit," a law was enacted in
Parliament, abolishing imprisonment for debt, that made impossible the recurrence in real life of the pitiful scenes of the
debtors' prison portrayed in that work.
The debtor's real estate was the last field into which this
philanthropic spirit led legislation in restricting the scope
of execution. Through the peculiarly American laws,
known as the "Homestead Laws," a debtor's home with its
environing land was exempted from levy and sale. The
first of the Homestead laws was passed in 1839 in Texas,
while an independent state after its secession from Mexico
and prior to its annexation to this country. Similar laws
are, to-day, found upon the statute books of about half the
states.
Thus by the middle of the last century all the modem
forms of exemption from execution had taken shape. The
exemptions of the early feudal period were due not to saving provisions limiting the extent of the operation of writs,
but to the scanty remedies the then few writs of execution
afforded. Only personal property was available for execution. Land and the persons of debtors were not objects of
execution. Hence their exemption was complete. With
the change in institutions from a feudal to a commercial
state, land and the bodies of the debtors were made the objects of new writs of execution. The unlimited operation of
these writs, however favorable to the creditor or commercial
classes, was yet detrimental to the best interests of the state.
Completely to impoverish a debtor, and thus turn him and
perhaps his family into a burden upon the public, and indefinitely to imprison him, and both not only without producing any satisfaction of the debt, but even 'rendering its
satisfaction impossible from the destruction of the debtor's
opportunities and means of working out its satisfaction, were
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remedies that might have enabled a creditor to wreak his
vengeance upon a debtor, but were manifestly too harsh for
a society sensitive of the welfare of its members and alive
to its own best interests. Corrective legislation was required to restrict the boundless scope of execution, and this
was had by 185o. By that time imprisonment for debt had
been generally abolished, and such exemptions of real and
personal property were enacted as secured the debtor, assured of his liberty, relief from total impoverishment, and
sufficient means to enable him with proper industry to support himself and family, and perhaps eventually pay his
debts.
In this, as in many another field of the law, is evident the
tendency of a popular legislature, once started on a new
course of action, to pursue it until the original justifying
reasons are lost sight of, and special interests, regardless of
the limitations the true basis of the legislation imposes, lead
it to extravagances that bring the whole system into reproach. In many of our states exemption law has followed
exemption law, and constitutional enactment has intervened
to prevent a reaction, that would lead one to believe that the
legislature and the people of those states intended to relieve
all but the wealthiest members of the community from liability for their debts. In Alabama a homestead of the value
of $2,ooo, and personalty to the value of $I,ooo, in addition
to wearing apparel and wages, are exempt. In Arizona a
homestead to the value of $2,5oo, and personalty worth $500
are exempt. In Illinois the head of the family is entitled to
an exemption of a homestead valued at $i,ooo, and of personalty worth $4oo. In Missouri the heads of families in
large cities may claim exemption of $5oo worth of personalty, and a homestead worth $3,ooo. These are not isolated instances. Many of the other states are as liberal to
their debtors. At the other extreme are Pennsylvania and
Maryland. In neither is there any homestead exemption.
In the former the debtor can save from execution $300 worth
of his property, real or personal, besides wearinig apparel,
school books in actual use, and the Bible. In Maryland the
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exemption is of only $ioo worth of property. The exemption: laws of the western and southern states are comparatively recent. The present exemption law of Pennsylvania
dates back to 1845; 2 in Maryland to 186.8 The course of
legislation indicates that the more recent the law, the more
other than the original reasons for exemption laws guide legislative action. The relief of debtors from impoverishment
seems to have been attained in Pennsylvania as early as 1845
by a law exempting but $3oo worth of property. Some
other purpose is evidently sought by legislation or constitutional provision under which is exempted property to the
value of $2,5oo or $3,000, sums several times the average
wealth of the individuals of the state.
It is in theWestern and Southern states that the exemption
and homestead laws are most liberal to debtors. After the
civil war the Southern states, in their new constitutions and
statutes, restricted the scope of execution by their extensive
exemptions in order to enable their citizens to rebuild their
shattered fortunes, and enjoy such freedom from the efforts
of creditors to obtain satisfaction as would enable them to
accomplish this object. They were distinctively debtor
states; and their laws were distinctively debtors' laws. Other
motives inspired equally liberal exemptions in the West.
With ample territory but sparsely settled, these states held
out as an inducement to emigration from the East the boon
of a large homestead that could not be reached by creditors,
and thus assured to new residents a permanent home. In the
competition between states to protect their own citizens
against non-resident creditors, and to attract citizens to settle upon and develop great areas of uncultivated lands, the
exemption laws of the South and *Westwaxed broader and
broader; the rights of creditors were forgotten and the
vicious effect of such laws upon their own citizens was
ignored.
To relieve a man from the performance of his obligations
is a sure way to lower his character, and when this is ac2 Act of Assembly April 9th, 1849, P. L. 533.
3

Laws x86I, chap. 7, sec. 2.
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complished by general laws that all debtors may invoke to
defeat creditors, the moral tone of the whole community will
suffer. It is not in the wrong done the creditors that excessive exemption laws are most harmful in effect, but in the
lowered standard of commercial honesty which they foster.
Credit will be cautiously granted where collection is difficult,
and thus in a measure the creditor class can protect itself
from financial loss; but the undermining of the honest determination to pay a debt, and.the encouragement to the shirking of obligations, ending perhaps in deliberate attempts to
defraud creditors, are results of laws which place a man's
pr6perty to the value of two or three or more thousands of
dollars beyond the reach of creditors that cannot be obviated.
Not the least of the evils consequent on an excessive exemption is the disrepute into which it brings the efficacy of
the processes of the law. The practical difficulty of collecting debts by reason of the "outrageous liberality" of the
exemption laws, in several of the states, has led the professors of the law 'itself to propound the- serious jest that in
those jurisdictions the laws would be simplified by statutes
abolishing actions of assumpsit or providing that no debt
shall be collected by action.' There is sound public policy
in an exemption of sufficient of a man's estate to save him
and his family from utter want, and to enable him to continue the struggle for existence; but there is insidious evil in
exemption laws which do more than this.
The decisions declare that there are two objects to be
achieved by a sound exemption law, the one having regard
to the protection of the family of the debtor, the other to the
protection of the debtor himself, from total impoverishment.
In Leavitt v. Metcalf, 2 Vt. 342 (1829), Judge Turner said,
in speaking of the exemption law of Vermont: "It is properly a remedial statute, evidently intended to prevent families
from being stript of the last means of support, and left to
suffer, or cast as a burden upon the public; and to rescue
them from the hands of unfeeling creditors; and the better
4 See " Chicago Legal News," vol. 16, p. -6o (z884). Address before
Ark. St. Bar Assn.; Ark. St. Bar "Assn. Rep., 1887, p. 40.
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to enable such poor debtors to satisfy the just demands
against them." The statutes of the several states are variously framed to accomplish these objects. In some only
"householders" or" heads" of families are entitled to claim
exemption; in others broader provision is made for heads of
families than for other debtors; while in still other states the
exemption is allowed to all debtors alike.
In New York, a personal property and homestead exemption is extended to "householders."
Others are entitled to
no exemption. Such a law, Judge Parker says, in Griffin
v. Sutherland, 14 Barb. 456 (1852), "was made for the
benefit of the family, rather than its head, the debtor. Its
object concerns a question of public policy. It is to keep
together the wife and children, that the latter may be trained
and educated to become useful members of society; to protect them against the dangers to which they would be exposed by being scattered, at a tender age, and to secure them
the means of instruction and improvement." That many
of the states, other than New York, make the family the
paramount object of their solicitude is manifest in their laws.
The "head of the family" or "householder" is alone entitled to exemption in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana and Virginia; while in New Jersey, a "person of family" is the
only one who may claim the benefit of the exemption law. In
the majority of the states provision is made for all debtors,
but the exemption allowed unmarried men upon whom no
family is dependent for support is less liberal than that extended to debtors who support a family. Thus, in Missouri,
to the head of a family is exempted personalty to the value
of $5oo, and a homestead worth from $I,5OO to $3,ooo, according to its location; while one not the head of a family
may claim only wearing apparel, and necessary tools and implements of trade. In Illinois, necessary wearing apparel,
Bibles, school books and family pictures and $ioo worth of
other personal property are exempt from execution against
any debtor, but when issued against a debtor who is the
head of a family residing with it, he may claim in addition
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$300 worth of other property, and, if a householder of family, a homestead worth $i,ooo.
Pennsylvania is a type of the remaining class of states,
wherein the statutory exemption is allowable to all debtors
alike, whether they be men of family or bachelors. The
policy of such laws was explained in Snow v. Dill, 13 Phila.
138 (1878), by Judge Thayer. He said: "All laws of this
character may be said to constitute a system of poor laws
for the state to be intended for the protection of the poor of
our own state. .

.

. Except for the protection afforded by

these laws to our own people many debtors might be reduced
to such a state of destitution as to make it necessary to subsist them at the public charge."
The exemption laws seem thus to be founded upon sound
principles of public policy. Whether framed with a view
to the protection of families alone, or contemplating the protection of the debtor himself besides, these laws are an expression of the regard of the state for its own highest interests, in preserving the efficiency of its citizens from total impairment. When exemption laws so far restrict the scope
Qf execution as to accomplish more than this, they unduly
limit the rights of creditors, with mischievous results in debasing commercial and moral standards and bringing the
efficacy of the processes of the law into disrepute. Such excessive exemptions cannot be justified. On the other hand,
the exemption laws should be broad enough and should be
so construed as to accomplish their object. The right of a
creditor to complete satisfaction is one that the law should
permit to be pursued to the fullest extent, saving only that in
its pursuit, for its own welfare, the state should not permit
the debtor to be so far impoverished as to render him and
those dependent upon him a charge upon the community
without the means of subsistence or of continuing at some
gainful occupation.
Each of the states has an exemption law, which, if enforced so as assure to every debtor the benefit of its provisions under all circumstances, is amply sufficient to protect
the debtor and his family. In the vast majority of the states,
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no executory agreement of the debtor to waive the exemption is upheld. Such a contract is regarded as contravening
public policy, and hence void as being illegal. The broader
interests of the state will not admit of the enforcement of
such a contract, whatever be the peculiar interests of the parties thereto leading to its formation. While this is generally the law, there are some states in which a contrary rule
obtains, under which legal sanction is given to executory
agreements waiving exemption. In Alabama the constitution and statutes of the state ' provide that no waiver of
exemption shall be effective unless in writing, and, if it relates to real estate, unless signed by husband and wife and
witnessed. In Georgia the constitution' permits a debtor to
waive exemption by a writing, but no waiver shall extend to
wearing apparel and $3oo worth of household goods, kitchen
furniture and provisions. In Illinois ' waiver of the homestead exemption by executory agreement is valid only when
reduced to writing subscribed by the householder and his
wife, and acknowledged like a deed. In the same state it
is determined by judicial decision that executory agreements
waiving exemption as to personalty are valid if made by an
unmarried man; 8 but are void as against public policy if
made by a married man.' This distinction is founded upon
the evident policy of the exemption laws of the state in seeking to protect families rather than unmarried individuals.
As heretofore noted, the Illinois laws extend a far more liberal exemption to householders and men who are heads of
families than to debtors not so circumstanced.
Pennsylvania. it is believed, is the only state wherein,
without statutory or constitutional countenance, but solely
by judicial construction, it is held that executory agreements
waiving exemption are enforceable by whatsoever class or
character of debtor made. It is difficult to sustain such con5 Alabama Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 7. Code Sec. 2I04 el seq.
8
Art. 9, Sec. 3.
Laws 1873, p. 99. Earlier law was the same: L. i85r, p. 25.
8 Powell vs. Dailey, 163 Il. 646 (1896).
9 Recht vs. Kelly, 82 Ill. 147 (1876).
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struction. When it is borne in mind that the exemption laws
are passed from the highest motives of public policy, it would
seem that it were beyond the power of the individual to set
the object of those laws at naught and make possible the
very consummation they were designed to prevent. It is
true that in many of the states the exemption laws may fail
of their object by reason of the neglect of the debtor to claim
their benefit after execution has been levied. In others of
the states the exemption law is self-acting. The property
exempt is not subject to execution. In these states the possible neglect on the part of the debtor to claim exemption is
guarded against. The Pennsylvania Statute is not so
worded as to withdraw exempt property from execution.
The statute becomes operative only if its provisions are invoked by the debtor. If no claim for exemption is made,
the exigency of the execution may extend to the last article
of property the debtor owns. In a sense, this is a waiver of
exemption; and it was, perhaps, with the knowledge of the
sanction given this form of waiver in mind that the courts
of Pennsylvania upheld the validity of executory agreements
waiving exemption. The leading case is Case v. DTnmore,
23 Pa. 93, decided in 1854, five years after the enactment of
the exemption law it construed. Judge Lewis there said:
" It has been repeatedly decided by this court that the exemption
of goods from execution under the act of 1849 is a privilege for the
benefit of the debtor which he may waive even by the omission to
claim it at the proper time, without any express contract for the purpose. But where at the time of contracting the debt he agrees to
waive the benefit of the exemption, and this forms the ground of the
credit given to him, the injustice of permitting him to violate his contract and thus to defraud his creditor, is too palpable to need illustratiorl, or to require the aid of precedents to discountenance it. Notwithstanding the benevolent provisions of the statute in favor of unfortunate and thoughtless debtors, it wzs far from the intention of
the legislature to deprive free citizens of the State of the right, upon
due deliberation, to make their own contracts in their own way, in
regard to securing the payment of debts honestly due. Creditors are
still recognized as having some rights, and it was not the intention
of the legislature to destroy them by impairing the obligation of contracts. It frequently happens that the creditor is more in need of
public sympathy than the debtor. When a poor man is unjustly kept
out of money due to him, the distress arising from the want of it is
often greater than that caused to the other party by its collection.
If the suffering was but equal, it is plain that one man should not
suffer for the follies or misfortunes of another. Every one should
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bear his own burthen. The statute which exempts debtors from the
operation of this pripciple, did not take away from them the right
to waive the privilege thus conferred whenever their consciences or
their recessities prompted the waiver." 10

These are the words of a man impressed with the sense of
personal obligation and duty. The spirit in which the opin-.
ion is conceived is admirable in the individual, but perhaps
not sufficiently broad for the formulation of a rule which
should bind all debtors. The exemption laws were conceived from a regard for the weakest of the citizens of a
state to prevent their reduction to a condition of complete
want, and to prevent their becoming charges upon the public. Their necessities at a time when entering into a contract
might, and often undoubtedly do, lead them into offering
extravagant inducements to a creditor or into submitting to
the imposition of ruinous terms.
If excessive interest is
contracted for, under such circumstances, the law does not
hesitate to strike down the excess, and thus brush aside the
contract of the parties, and in effect limit their capacity for
contracting. Why should not the exemption laws be enforced in the same manner as the laws against usury? Reasons of public policy are the basis of each, and not even the
necessities of debtors should be permitted to validate contracts that render the provisiorrs of such laws nugatory. Indeed, it is against the consequences of their necessities that
the law chiefly aims to protect debtors. A man cannot contract away his liberty. He should not be permitted to bargain away the last dollar's worth of property wherewith he
might have procured food and raiment for himself and
family.
When a man, or one of his family who have the right to
make the claim for him, omits to claim exemption when execution is levied against him, it is safe to assume that they
can afford the waiver. Unless the statute is framed in such
wise as to be self-operative, by the absolute denial of the
right to levy execution against exempted property, its bene10 See similar reasoning of Judge Thompson in Smiey v. Bowman, 3
Gr. (Pa.) z32 (iS6i), and Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. 225 (I858); and of

Judge Strong in Line's app. 2 Gr. (Pa.) 197 (i858).
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ficentprovisions can be enjoyed when execution is levied only
by claiming their benefit. A waiver of the claim at such
time is an omission against which the law cannot guard, and
is obviously a totally different thing from an executory contract of waiver, which can be enforced against the will of the
debtor when the levy is made only by the intervention or
with the sanction of the law. The reckless indifference with
which a debtor will sign a waiver upon assuming an obligation, his heedlessness of consequences at such a time, and
over-confident assurance of ability to meet his obligations at
maturity, place him at the mercy of an exacting creditor.
When the contractual exactions of a creditor in other respects contravene the policy of the lav, they are unenforceable. There is no reason why the law should be less effective
in avoiding contracts which contravene its policy as declared
in the exemption laws.
Outside of Pennsylvania these views have received general
expression. There are abundant decisions of the courts of
nearly all the states in which the invalidity of executory
waivers is demonstrated. One of the ablest may well be
quoted at length. In Kneetle v. Newcomb, 22 N. Y. 249
(186o), Judge Denio says:
"The statutes which allow a debtor . . . to retain, as against the
legal remedies of his creditors, certain articles of prime necessity, to
a limited amount, are based upon views of policy and humanity, which
would be frustrated if an agreement like that contained in these notes,
entered into in connection with the principal contract, could be sustained. A few words contained in any note or obligation would
operate to change the law between those parties, and so far disappoint the intentions of the legislature. If effect shall be given to
such provisions, it is likely that they will be generally inserted in
obligations for small demands, and in that way the policy of the law
will be completely overthrown. Every honest man who contracts
a debt expects to pay it, and believes he will be able to do so without having his property,. s61d on execution. No one worthy to be
trusted would, therefore, be apt to object to a clause subjecting all
his property to levy on execution in case of non-payment. It was
against the consequences of this over-confidence, and the readiness
of men to make contracts which may deprive them and their families
of articles indispensable to their comfort, that the legislature has
undertaken to interpose.
"When a man's last cow is taken on an execution on a judgment
rendered upon one of these notes, it is no sufficient answer to say that
it was done pursuant to his consent, freely given, when he contracted
the debt. The law was designed to protect him against his own
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improvidence in giving such consent. The statutes contain many
examples of legislation based upon the same motives. The laws
against usury, those which forbid imprisonment for debt, and those
which allow a redemption after the sale of land on execution are of
this class. .

.

. In these cases the law seeks to mitigate the conse-

quences of men's thoughtlessness and improvidence, and it does not,
I think, allow its policy to be evaded by any language which may be
inserted.in the contract. It is not always equally careful to shield
persons from those acts, which, instead of being promissory in their
character and prospective in their operation, take effect immediately.
One may turn out his last cow on execution, or may release an equity
of redemption, and he will be bound by the act. In thus discriminating
the law takes notice of the readiness with which sanguine and incautious men will make improvident contract$ which look to the future
for their consummation, when, if the results were to be presently
realized, they would not enter into them at all......
"The maxim tnodus et convcntio vincunt legemn is not of universal application. It applies only to agreements in themselves legal. Where
no rule of law or principle of public policy is concerned, the parties
may by contract make a law for themselves. One object of the
municipal law is to promote the general welfare of society. The
exemption laws seek to accomplish by taking from the head of the
family the power to deprive it of certain property by contracting
debts which shall enable the creditors to take such property on execution. The parties to this contract sought to set aside those laws,
so far as this debt was concerned. This they could not do." 11

That the validity of executory waivers, of exemption is
still upheld in Pennsylvania attests to the force of the principle of Stare decisis. The courts of that state have long since
expressed regret that broader views of the question were not
taken when it first came up for decision. In O'Nail v. Craig,
56 Pa. 161 (1867), Judge Strong said:
"Had it been determined, immediately after-the passage
of the Act of April 9th, 1849, that a debtor could not deprive
himself of that exemption from execution of a portion of his
property allowed by the statute, by any agreement made at
the time the debt was created, the object of the legislation
would doubtless have been better secured." 12
The construction of the exemption laws which admits of
their waiver by executory agreement ignores the principles
of public policy which alone justify those laws. In effect,
11 For other expressions of opinion in accord with that of Judge
Denio, see Miles v. Bennett, 94 Tenn. 651 (1895); Carter v. Carter, 20
Fla. 558 (1884); Maxley v. Ragan, 1o Bush (Ky.) 158 (1874); and Recht v.
Kelly, x63 Ill. 646 (1896).
12 See also Shelly's app., 36 Pa. 373 (i86o); Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa.
393 (1865); and Garretson v. Felix, 6 Kulp 211 (1892).
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this narrow construction is as vicious as is the extreme liberality of the statutes in other states. In the latter case the
creditors, in the former case the community itself, may suffer. In either case the debtor is subjected to strong temptations leading to fraud. Where exemptions are too liberal,
their effect on debtors has been noted. Where the construction of the law is narrow, it drives the debtor, who seeks to
escape the impoverishment the law admits of, to resort to all
the familiar devices intended to withdraw his property from
the reach of creditors. Concealment of assets and the inevitable property claim by third persons are the consequences of
the narrow construction of exemption laws, which sanctions
their waiver by executory agreement.
The extent and the construction of the exemption laws
should be determined by the purposes those laws were intended to accomplish. For the benefit of creditors, and
after a long evolution, the whole of a man's estate and his
person, as well, were subjected to various writs of execution.
The exemption laws were a reaction against such drastic
remedies, designed for the protection both of the state and
of the individual debtor and his family, and were not intended to restrict the creditor's rights any further than was
necessary to maintain the independence and freedom of a
debtor and preserve his ability to support himself and his
family. Their benevolent purposes should neither be abused
by outrageously liberal statutory enactments, nor frustrated
by narrow judicial construction.
Stanley Folz.

